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In Regulation and Its Reform, Stephen Breyer sets forth an 
analytical structure for classifying regulatory programs and 
identifying candidates for reform. This review article summarizes 
Breyer's ideas in schematic form, and 0valuates their usefulness for 
the purposes set forth in the book . 
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Regulatory reform, like death and taxes, seems always to be 
with us. For decades armies of scholars in law, economics, political 
science and public administration have rode to tenure on treatises 
about regulatory policies. And, as soon as one Presidentially 
commissioned study of regulatory reform rolls off the presses, another 
is being organized . 
In this milieau, it is not easy to find a truly original new 
general insight about regulation and its reform. Stephen Breyer has 
nonetheless tried, not so much by saying specific things that are new, 
but by constructing an overall framework for analyzing regulation in a 
way that is useful in structuring the debate about reform.1 
In many ways, the book is impressive. It seeks to be 
comprehensive, covering a wide range of regulatory agencies and 
policies of both federal and state governments, and even some elements 
of tax policy, antitrust and tort law. Moreover, the discussions are 
usually detailed, using specific examples of regulatory decisions -- with 
facts, figures and c itations -- to illustrate more general points. But 
in the end, the book is not wholly satisfying: some important issues 
are overlooked or dealt with in a cursory fashion, and some others are 
resolved in discussions that, while detailed, seem arbitrary in choice 
of evidence, mode of analysis, and ultimate conclusion . 
The purposes of the book are broad. First, it is a 
comprehensive analysis of the "topical issue of regulatory reform, 112 
aimed at the government official or "informed layman" who seeks better 
understanding of an important public policy issue. For these people, 
the book is a handbook for identifying specific regulatory programs 
that are candidates for reform. Second, it is a textbook that regards 
'�egulation as a distinct discipline" and that is designed '�o help 
teach it as a separate subject.113 Thir!l, it is an original scholarly 
work for others doing research in the field insofar as it provides a 
new and productive way of organizing one's thoughts about regulation 
and how it works. 
The new ideas are twofold. One is a method of categorizing 
regulatory policies. It is intended to produce groupings of programs 
that are large enough to be subject to generalizations that can be 
illustrated by interpolicy comparisons, but specific enough to have 
significance in informing the development of specific new or reformed 
regulatory policies. The second new idea is the concept of "mismatch" 
-- a situation in which a particular regulatory approach is adopted to 
attack problems for which it is not suited. In addition, one quite 
interesting chapter contains the author's views about how successfully 
to undertake the process of reforming a regulatory program, based upon 
his experiences as a staff member for Senator Kennedy during the period 
of deregulation of the airlines, 
2 
3 
The book is organized topically into four parts, In the 
Introduction, Breyer describes his purposes and basic approach. 
Following this, Part I lays out his "framework" or theoretical 
structure for analyzing regulatory programs. Part I I  uses this 
structure to evaluate the appropriateness of several specific 
regulatory policies, illustrating how the general points made in Part I 
can be used to illuminate the discussion of concrete policy problems. 
Part I I I  discusses how one proceeds to actual regulatory reform. 
The Introduction is an essential element to the book; indeed, 
to understand the book's motivation is probably impossible without 
reading it, In it Breyer reveals that he is an unabashed subscriber to 
the "public interest" theory of regulation -- that is, that he analyzes 
and evaluates regulation as if it were created to serve a general 
public interest, He adopts this position for normative reasons, in 
that he thinks that whatever the source of regulatory laws and actions, 
their justifications must be that the general public interest is 
served. Moreover, Breyer comes close to equating the general public 
interest in regulatory policy with an improvement in economic 
efficiency, Hence the primary justification of regulation is to 
ameliorate market failures. Several paragraphs are devoted to 
differentiating his approach from "general causal theories explaining 
the origin of regulation or its effects.114 The disclaimer
notwithstanding, Breyer's belief that the book is important for policy 
purposes, and his prescription for how to organize a governmental 
process that produces a valuable regulatory reform, make sense only if 
policymakers are motivated in large measure by the pursuit of economic 
efficiency. This resurrection of the public interest theory of 
regulation is common among the acade1;; ice who participated in airline 
deregulation.s 
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The second major point in the Introduction is Breyer'a emphasis 
on the "second best" nature of the 1 :·al world, He sees his book as 
setting forth the analog in regulatory policy to the economic theory of 
market failures. The latter identifies specific sources of market 
failures: third-party effects, monopoly, etc, To produce a balanced, 
rational analysis of the wisdom of attacking a market failure in any 
specific way, according to Breyer, requires an equally systematic 
description of the sources and types of regulatory failure. This has 
meaning, of course, in the specific context of the Breyer assumption 
about the public interest -- that its ob jective is economic efficiency, 
for then regulatory failures, like market failures, become specific 
causes of an inability of a regulatory institution to achieve perfect 
efficiency, The hard, real policy choice, then, is a tolerably good 
mix of inefficient markets, inefficient regulatory interventions, and 
other inefficient policy instruments. The relative emphasis on each 
markets, regulation, other policies -- will turn on the relative 
strengths and weaknesses of the three for the specific case at hand , 
Part I, A Theory of Regulation, and the first chapter of 
Part I I, ''Match and Mismatch," are the heart of the book. They contain 
the principal original contribution, which is the analytical framework 
for classifying and analyzing regulatory policies. The basic idea of 
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these chapters is to construct a comprehensive, all-inclusive table 
that depicts policies that deal with market failures for which 
regulation is a possible solution. Breyer's schema is shown in Figure 1, 
in which the columns are the justifications for regulation and the rows 
are the alternative public policy approaches that are available: six 
types of regulation and seven other policies that Breyer does not call 
regulation. The boxes in the table are to be filled in with the 
characteristics of a policy that combines the problem and approach of 
the corresponding column and row. A ''mismatch" is when, for any given 
problem (column ), the government picks the wrong policy approach (row) . 
Of course, the real world is more complicated than this, for 
the policy alternatives can be combined. Strictly speaking, one needs 
to add more rows, each one corresponding to various combinations of the 
"pure" policy alternatives comprising the thirteen rows in the table. 
But the essence of the idea remains the same: there will be some boxes 
that represent "matches" in that they are reasonable ways to attack the 
corresponding problems, while the rest will be mismatches, 
The analyst identifies the matches and mismatches by a three-
step process. First, some boxes can be ruled out a priori because the 
problem and the approach have nothing in com mon. Some of these are 
shown by Xe on the figure. Second, some boxes can be ruled out on 
theoretical grounds because the inherent properties of the approach 
will lead to a "policy failure" as serious as the ''market failure" in 
the problem. Some of these cases that are discussed in the book are 
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Alternative Policy Approaches ,.,. 0 
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Cost-Based Price Regulation w x M x M -
Historical Price Regulation x M x M 
Public Interest Allocation M 
Historical Allocation M 
Stand11rd Setting x M x x 
Individualized Screening x x 
Antitrust M x x x w -
Information Disclosure x x x w x -
� 
-
Taxation w w 
Marketable Rights w x 




Key: W - winners 
M - mismatches 
X - a priori lrrelevent 
to a problem remains, detailed case analysis of the specific market 
failure in question -- not the generic type, but the specific example 
-- can be focused on selecting among them. Some winners according to 
the book are shown by Ws in the figure. 
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Whether all of this makes sense depends upon whether the 
categories are more illuminating than confusing, and whether the boxes 
that are serious contenders really represent distinct, valid policy 
alternatives. My summary opinion is that there are too many 
distinctions, that the number of boxes is far greater than the number 
of distinct policy options, and that the categorization scheme is not 
helpful at its most important level -- theoretical characterizations of 
inherent weaknesses of particular policy approaches. 
The source of the excessive detail is primarily the list of 
independent policy approaches, which I believe are far fewer in number 
than Breyer presents, although there are too many different 
justifications as well. The five ma jor justifications for regulation 
are unexceptional, especially given that one -- excessive competition 
-- is a straw man as a justification (but not as an excuse) that Breyer 
repeatedly beats throughout the book. The five minor justifications 
are briefly described in an especially muddy section.6 Two are 
important, and deserve greater attention: moral hazard (for example, 
the adverse selection problem in insurance) and paternalism (a loaded 
way of saying that one person may not want another person to bear even 
voluntarily certain harmful risks). Three are completely opaque as 
independent justifications. One is unequal bargaining power, which 
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does not appear different from monopoly. Moreover, the point of some 
policies seems to be to make bargaining power less equal. A second is 
rationalization, which occurs when an industry has firms that are 
inefficiently small or insufficiently coordinated. What is this if not 
an externality problem, imperfect information, or excess competition, 
assuming it is not caused by regulation itself? Third is scarcity, a 
situation in which government decides "to abandon the market" because 
something is in scarce supply. How is this independent of either 
external effects or economic rents? 
Doing away with these three, plus excessive competition which 
we know to be on the list for comic relief, we are down to six 
independent and reasonable justifications. The only one that is left 
out is the reduction or spread of uncertainty, as put forth by Owen and 
Braeutigam.7 They argue that one purpose of regulation is insurance 
motivated by the perception that volatile markets in goods and services 
of great importance produce capricious, random redistributions of 
income . 
Most of Part I is devoted to a detailed discussion of the six 
forms of regulation shown in the rows of Figure 1. In addition, one 
chapter briefly discusses the seven nonregulatory alternatives. Some 
of these categories are not completely clear, and require elaboration. 
One is allocation, and how the types differ. By "allocation," 
Breyer means deciding who gets to engage in a specific activity or use 
a particular resource. '�llocation under a public interest standard" 
refers to a process in which criterin are adopted for picking the best 
applicants, whereas historical allocations refers to a process that 
grants goodies by grandfathering , 
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The difficulty with these categories is that for the most part 
allocation is not independent of other regulatory activities. Indeed, 
..!!11 economic institutions are methods of allocating valuable things, 
The examples in the book include allocating the rights to goods made 
more scarce by economic regulation, In addition, it is not a stretch 
to regard environmental regulation as a process by which permits to use 
airehede and waterways are allocated among polluters according to a 
public interest standard. And, of course, all economic regulation -­
even of natural monopolies -- involves as its f iret step granting a 
franchise, or certificate of convenience and necessity, that enables 
the recipient to provide service. Allocation as an explicit primary 
activity is quite rare, with allocation of the use of the 
electromagnetic spectrum by the Federal Com munications Commission the 
most important example, and others including concession rights in 
national parks, landing rights at airports, and liquor licenses in 
states the limit their number. In all of these cases the policy is 
linked to externalities, and is in reality not terribly distinct from 
marketable rights because regulators normally allow them to be traded 
relatively freely , 
Lese straightforward is the definition of standard setting and 
how it differs from several others. The book does not actually define 
standard setting regulation; instead it offers a detailed description 
of the process. Screening is defined: "highly general standards • •
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to screen out, on a case-by-case basis, those individual products or 
persons that are unacceptable.11 8 The distinction between screening and 
standards, apparently, involves in part a degree of specificity in the 
standard and the emphasis on cases, Breyer also states that screening 
is to be distinguished from allocation under a public interest standard 
because the latter usually involves picking a few winners from among a 
larger group of qualified applicants, while the former involves weeding 
out unfit applicants without explicitly limiting the number of winners, 
Finally, standards are also distinguished from information disclosure, 
for the former require something epecif ic about a product or process, 
while the latter provides an individual with the information regarded 
as necessary to write hie or her own standards. By inference from 
these distinctions, standards are specific, minimally-acceptable design 
and/or performance characteristics applied to products and processes, 
but not to people, services, or communications, I include 
communications in the list not just because labeling and advertising 
are in the disclosure box, but also because the "seven words you can't 
say on radio" will, when said, deprive the radio station of its 
license, which is a product of allocation under a public interest 
standard. 
Breyer recognizes that these categories are indistinct, but the 
problem is deeper than some loose ends in an otherwise useful 
classification scheme. To the extent these items do differ, they do so 
because basically similar regulatory statutes and responsibilities have 
caused agencies over time to adjust the details of regulatory policy to 
the specific characteristics of the problems that they face. Thus, 
there is no independence of type and method; one general approach -­
writing rules about products, processes and workplaces in order to 
protect people -- has led to different kinds of rules, with different 
degrees of generality, for different problems. Of course, if this is 
true, Breyer's approach is a make-work scheme, causing the analyst to 
focus on comparing several discrete boxes that are in truth the same 
policy under different manifestations of the same general problem. 
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An illustration of how the boxes run together is to be found in 
the approach to controlling air pollution that has been taken since the 
1977 ammendments to the Clean Air Act, The Environmental Protection 
Agency begins by setting maximum allowable concentrations of the most 
important pollutants. This implicitly places a limit on total 
emissions in every region, a standard that is necessary for setting 
more detailed regulations for each specific source and for initializing 
a market in emissions rights. According to the Act, EPA is required to 
set performance standards for new sources of pollution, These are both 
specific in details and general in applicability, and so are truly 
standards in Breyer's lexicon. Meanwhile, states are supposed to adopt 
a plan for reducing emissions from old sources in areas that do not 
satisfy the ambient air quality standard. Sometimes these are 
standards for source categories, but often they are decided on a case­
by-case basis because of differences among the sources in a single 
category -- or because there is only one major polluter of a particular 
type in the region. And overlaying all of this is the opportunity for 
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trades of emissions permits among old sources, subject to various rules 
and regulations, and other procedures whereby new sources offset their 
increment to pollution in an ar�a by ahating emissions from other 
sources, These are a form of marketable permits, but the trades are 
usually required to gain prior approval in a regulatory process, 
Usually an approved trade becomes a revision in the standards for 
trading partners that reflects the situation after the trade, In many 
cases, all this will be coupled with an emissions tax and noncompliance 
fees to add some incentive to emissions reductions. And finally, 
regulators are attempting to reduce em issions on a source-by-source 
basis for pollutants for which there is no ambient air quality 
standard. Thus, one generally will find a single agency, dealing with 
a single problem, by simultaneous application of most of the serious 
options for dealing with externalities. Moreover, it will be doing so 
not by consciously thinking of these methods as distinct approaches, 
but as one comprehensive policy,9 
The problem this raises for policymaking is the following, 
Breyer's framework and method is aimed at the highest political level 
of decisions: the Congress and the W hite House. Its orientation is 
writing laws that establish regulatory programs, At this level, Breyer 
wants analysts to pick institutional approaches to regulatory problems 
at an intermediate level of generality, namely a kind of policy problem 
such as pollution, impure foods, ineffective and dangerous drugs, 
unsafe consumer products, etc, The alternative argument is that at the 
legislative level Congress should be less specific about the approach 
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taken by regulators, that a flaw in the Clean Air Act, for example, is 
that it is insufficiently eclectic in the range of tools it gives to 
EPA. This is not an argument for vague legislation; it is perfectly 
consistent to argue that Congress should be more specific about its 
objectives but lees specific about the degree of reliance on particular 
regulatory approaches. 
Part I I I  of the Breyer book contains chapters on several 
specific regulatory issues: airlines, trucks, natural gas, pollution 
and telecommunications, All but the last are designed to illustrate 
mismatches, but two of the four -- trucks and airlines are hardly 
valid examples, because their justification ie excessive competition. 
Natural gae, an example of rent control through cost-based regulation, 
and environmental pollution, an example of externalities control 
through standards, are argued to be better attacked by incentive-based 
approaches (taxes and marketable permits ), The telecommunications 
chapter is inconclusive, presenting some of the arguments for and 
against reliance ·on either regulated monopoly or competition, 
These chapters are clearly written for the textbook purpose of 
the treatise; they tend to be relatively thin, summarizing the main 
facts, issues and policy alternatives, but presenting little or no 
original ideas. Some have gaping holes; how, for example, could one 
devote an entire chapter to telecommunications regulation without even 
mentioning equipment markets or the implications of the differences in 
optimal communications systems for voice, computers and broadcasters? 
As case studies, these chapters are significantly less interesting than 
are available in other books.lo Of course, the others do not make use
of the Breyer analytical framework. This matters little, for in no 
instance does Breyer's framework ploy a decisive role in his study of 
the cases, nor does he say anything that hae not already been said by 
others, 
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The final two chapters of the book, constituting Part I I I, are 
about approaches to reforming policy, One describes the procedures 
followed in airline deregulation, aud is very interesting. Breyer 
makes the point convincingly that careful empirical, case-study work is 
necessary to make a major change in regulatory legislation, He sets 
forth several key elements of successful reform: a committed, 
preferrably bipartisan alliance of members of Congress and political 
leaders in the Executive; a solid baLkdrop of academic research 
documenting the problem and ite causes; a visible reform process that 
attracts the media; and in-house objective staff that treat seriously 
every important claim about the effects of a policy, in the end 
providing convincing analysis about its merits. The chapter makes 
interesting reading ae an insider's view of how airline deregulation 
came about. It is less convincing as a ''how-to" guide to the intrepid 
reformer. Senator Kennedy did not succeed in a later attempt to reform 
drug regulation that was undertaken in a similar fashion, for example. 
It would have been interesting to see if Breyer could have successfully 
accomplished his objectives with respect to the uee of incentives in 
pollution policy in the face of the interest-group politics that proved 
so overwhelming in the battle over the Clean Air Act Amendments of 
1977.11 The new source performance standards for coal-fired electric 
generation facilities that were built into the Clean Air Act epitomize 
everything Breyer dislikes about the standard-setting approach to 
environmental regulation. Too bad he was not in Washington working on 
this issue; we might have had better environmental policy, but 
at least we would have had a fascinating implementation chapter in his 
book! 
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The last chapter discusses '�eneric" approaches to regulatory 
reform -- that is, solutions that take the form of across-the-board 
changes in the way regulation is undertaken. Examples are a regulatory 
budget, mandatory benefit/cost analysis, a science court for reviewing 
technical decisions, and Congressional reviews of regulatory decisions. 
Breyer views many of these proposals favorably, but does not regard 
them as addressed to the salient issue: that the wrong approach is 
often used to attack a regulatory problem, Obviously. if his central 
thesis is correct, it cannot be seriously ameliorated by smarter 
commissions, one-house vetos, or improved administrative procedures. 
This chapter provides an interesting summary and review of a long list 
of generic reform proposals. It is useful in this regard; however, it 
is more an appendix than a concluding chapter, for it bears little 
relation to the central thesis and stream of analysis , 
The numerous examples and analytical investigations of 
different regulatory methods in Breyer's book provide several important 
lessons, and in fact illustrate a central point that Breyer seeks to 
make: that regulation has inherent weaknesses that manifest themselves 
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in different ways in different forms, One is that regulation as a 
process for gathering information and writing decisions to constrain 
business behavior "in the public interest" is a very difficult task 
that can be expected to produce inexact results. Hence, the erstwhile 
regulator should be reluctant to tackle a problem by regulating it 
unless the situation is quite bad and there are no reasonable 
alternatives. Second, administrative law makes regulators very 
dependent on the information that is available to them, and usually the 
information is biased and poor. This is an important source of the 
inexactness of regulation, and creaLeS the additional property that the 
more uncertain are the facts about the problem to be solved, the more 
likely it is that regulation will become hopelessly mired down -- or 
used by a special interest in control of information. Third, 
policymakers have probably been too reluctant to use more decentralized 
methods to attack the problems that give rise to regulation. Promising 
alternatives are incentives, information disclosure, and face-to-face 
bargaining. 
These are all good points. Breyer is a good scholar with an 
enormous amount of relevant knowledge and experience in regulation, so 
it is not surprising that his evaluations of regulatory policies and 
reform proposals are generally very sound. The trouble is, of course, 
that the merits of these points can be obscured more than illuminated 
by a cross-tabulation of problems and approaches that contains 130 
separate categories of public policies without yet getting to 
specifics. One does not need all this detail nor the concept of 
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mismatch to understand that regulated competition is pointless, that 
the use of price controls to extract economic rent causes shortages, or 
that the procedures of the F C C  for awarding broadcast licenses lack 
meaningful content. Hence, in the end, the overriding purpose of the 
book is not successfully served. The richness of detail is often 
penetrating and at times very interesting, and we would be better off 
if all the small analytical points about regulation were better 
understood by policymakers. But it does not add up to an insightful 
new way to look at regulation, 
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